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TO INFO	Chief, EM Chief of Station, Germany		HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 333500
FROM	Chief []	DATE 2 NOV 1960	
SUBJECT	The Marten Affair		RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED
ACTION REQUIRED	None, for your information only		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
REFERENCE(S)			

1. The following summary of the Marten affair as seen from [] may be of interest to Headquarters.

2. The German Background. The German background was not well understood in Greece. Marten had his own reasons for seeking rehabilitation. Pomer and Hainemann were interested not only in Marten's own case but in an attack on the German government. Der Spiegel was attacking its ancient enemy Dr. Giebbels and was quite willing to use the material from the Hamburger Echo without any great additional research on its own part.

3. Handling by the Government. There was early vacillation on the part of the government. The Prime Minister did not make a forceful statement to the effect that the honor of the Greek government could not be called in question by a convicted war criminal and a sensationalist magazine. He did not distinguish between the personal honor of individuals and the honor of the government and there was confusion about the question of instituting suits. The government was ill-prepared for the presentation of the case in Parliament and Karamanlis did not lead the floor fight. During the course of the debate Karamanlis corrected Under Defense Minister Themelis and Averof corrected Finance Minister Papaconstantinou. The government allowed EDA to accuse it of collaboration with the Germans and did not attack the Communists on Soviet collaboration or on the sensitive Bulgarian-Macedonian question.

4. The Non-Communist Opposition. The opposition did not instigate the Marten incident but they certainly attempted to exploit it to the fullest. The nationalist opposition was hampered by two factors: (a) owing to its political impotence, it presents no alternative to the Karamanlis government, and (b) it was loath to associate itself too openly with charges that were damaging to Greece's national pride. The opposition press displayed aspects of yellow journalism by its treatment of the accusations and by its scare headlines.

5. Communist Opposition. EDA tried to identify the government and all nationalists with German collaboration. They took the role of the major opposition party and therefore established to a further degree their prestige. It is not clear why they were not attacked more forcefully by the government.

6. Tentative Conclusions.

a. The opposition has sensed nervousness and vacillation on the part of the government regarding scandals; this is an invitation to a succession of attacks on similar themes.

b. Some erosion of EME was brought about and the psychological climate seems to favor the opposition's cry for a change in government.

c. The irresponsibility of a portion of the press was demonstrated.

d. Given the political maneuverings that resulted from the affair, the future election has assumed ever-increasing importance.

e. The absence of the King and Queen was advantageous to the monarchy because they were not dragged into the issue.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2001 2006		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED	

